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Reclaiming the Power of Thought
Dewey’s Critical Appropriation of Idealism
Jörg Volbers
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1. Introduction 
1 How ‘idealistic’ is Dewey’s philosophy, and why should we care? This article attempts to
answer  both  questions  by  taking  a  closer  look  at  Dewey’s  criticism of  idealism and
Kantian philosophy. Its aim is to reconstruct the systematic reasons for Dewey’s self-
understanding as someone who gradually “drifted away from Hegelianism” (LW 5: 154)
and from ‘idealism’ in a broad sense.1 This does not mean that we should take Dewey’s
reconstruction of idealism as the last word on that subject. Quite to the contrary: I am
sympathetic with current research which tries to show how much Hegel there still is in
Dewey (Bernstein 2013), or which points out how pragmatism’s critique of idealism is
unfair, or that it at least overstates their differences (Emundts 2013; Pinkard 2007; Stern
2011). But setting aside the question of its accurateness, Dewey’s criticism of idealism is
motivated by reasons which are important on their own. For what is at issue in Dewey’s
distancing from idealism, I want to claim, is the correct understanding of rationality.
Dewey  accuses  idealism  of  closing our  self-understanding  as  rational  beings  by
intellectualizing it. Thus, by looking more closely at Dewey’s relation to idealism, we gain
a  better  understanding  of  his  own  alternative  understanding  of  rationality  and  its
systematic motivation.
2 One implication of this approach is that we should focus on Dewey’s mature philosophy.
Dewey himself started his career as an idealist and then moved into the direction of
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pragmatism. But it is not until the appearance of Experience and Nature (1925) that his
emancipation of his own idealist roots took full shape and Dewey’s alternative position
came into fuller view – a position which he also explicitly dissociated from pragmatism,
which he eventually took to be a misleading and therefore inapt classification for his
work (cf. LW 12: 4). Thus, we will have to take the vantage point of these later works if we
want  to  gain  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  systematic  grounds  of  Dewey’s
criticism of idealism.
3 Given Dewey’s own early idealistic leanings, it is no surprise that Dewey’s criticism of this
tradition  is  far  from  a  simple  rejection.  It  operates  against  a  background  of  great
sympathy for the general direction of that tradition, and of Hegelianism in particular. For
Dewey, idealism rightly highlights the human power to lead a rational life, thus defending
a modern emancipation from theology and dogmatism. Idealism stands up for the power
of  critical  reflection as  well  as  for  the  constructive  capacity  of  reason to  determine
normatively binding values. In other words, it is an articulation of the free and self-
legislating power of the human being. Thus, Dewey’s criticism shares a common ground
with idealism’s modern affirmation of the critical power of reasoning. However, Dewey
accuses  idealism  of  ultimately  missing  its  main  objective,  by  devising  an  all  too
rationalistic defense of reason, putting too much weight on concepts, logic and wide-
ranging systematicity.
4 Focusing on this break seems to me particularly important with respect to Hegel. Hegel is
nowadays often read in a rather humane, post-metaphysical and, yes, even pragmatist
manner, as a social philosopher and as a defender of the varieties of experience (Pippin
1989; Pinkard 2002).  From such a perspective,  to accuse Hegel of holding an abstract
metaphysical ‘conceptualism’ – as Dewey seems to do – appears to be old-fashioned, one-
sided, or even simply wrong (Stern 2005; critical: Horstmann 1999). Yet, as I want to point
out, Dewey’s criticisms of idealism are not just exegetical. They express the wish, and
even the felt cultural need, for a philosophy which actually does make a difference to the
way  we  understand  ourselves.  In  particular,  his  criticisms  stand  for  the  hope  that
philosophy  can  and  should  not  be  left  to  an  intellectual  elite.  Idealism,  with  its
demanding and highly elaborated philosophical concepts, its speculative metaphysics and
its comprehensive aspiration, is not a natural candidate for such a democratic form of
philosophy.  So,  rather  than  focusing  on  the  hermeneutical  correctness  of  Dewey’s
understanding of  idealism,  I  want  to  show how,  by opposing certain aspects  of  that
tradition,  Dewey  is  attempting  to  reclaim the  importance  of  the  same  philosophical
question of rationality for ordinary life and everyday reflection that,  on one possible
reading, idealism originally sought to secure but failed to do so. 
5 Consequently,  the central  theme of Dewey’s mature philosophy becomes ‘experience,’
rather than ‘the concept’ or ‘the self,’ as in the idealist tradition. This is more than just a
pragmatist  appropriation of  an  Hegelian theme;  it  expresses  a  new set  of  priorities.
Idealism, as Dewey understands it,  conceives rational thought in terms of conceptual
understanding,  thus  giving conceptual  relations  methodological  and even ontological
priority. For Dewey, by contrast, thinking is subordinated to experience, and it therefore
only “occupies an intermediate and mediating place” (MW 10: 320; cf. also LW 1: 372).
Knowledge, likewise, is not an end in itself, but has always to be evaluated with respect to
the role it plays in concrete experience: “all intellectual knowing is but a method for
conducting an experiment” (MW 10: 324). Dewey considers thinking to be itself a form of
experience  and  not  the  other  way  around,  thus  highlighting  the  constitutive  non-
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cognitive, temporal and open dimension of all thought. Justly or unjustly, Dewey takes
idealism to offer an account of reason which ultimately ignores such non-cognitive ways
in which we are related to the world.
6 For reasons such as these, Dewey’s position is of more than mere historic interest. For
ultimately,  Dewey’s  criticism  aims  at  idealism  as  a  representative  of  what  he  calls
‘intellectualism.’ ‘Intellectualism,’ for Dewey, signifies the widespread philosophical belief
that  rational  thought  is  only  concerned  with  explicitly  articulated  knowledge  and
cognitive content. This perspective, Dewey claims, ultimately misses the embedded and
holistic nature of thought, as well as its relation to that what is not itself part of cognitive
operations.  It  is  this  ‘intellectualist’  way  of  treating  philosophical  problems,  against
which Dewey objects, and on which we have to concentrate in order to better understand
his break with idealism. 
7 From  that  perspective,  we  will  see  that  Dewey’s  criticism  opens  up  an  important
systematic  option  for  contemporary  philosophy.  His  rejection  of  the  excessive
valorisation of pure reason antedates a well-known and even well-trodden path in the
philosophies of the 20th century. Phenomenology, post-structuralism and critical theory
all agree that modern rationality is, if one might say so, excessively rational, and even
dangerously  so,  by  understanding  rationality  precisely  in  that  ‘intellectualist’  sense.
Moreover, they all took issue with idealism’s heritage, for this reason. As we now know,
however, this discussion is too often framed in binary terms which are themselves deeply
problematic  –  take,  for  example,  Dreyfus’  (2006)  phenomenological  opposition  of
‘conceptual determination’ vs. ‘bodily coping,’ or Adorno’s (Adorno & Horkheimer 2016)
claim that  enlightened  thinking  constitutively  ignores  the  subtleties  and  nuances  of
experience,  even  violently  so.  Foucault  once  called  this  modern  constellation  the
“blackmail of the enlightenment”: we seem forced to take sides, either for rationality or
against it, and depending on our choice, we can be accused of either excessive rationalism
or obscurantism. Ironically, from this perspective, the classical idealist systems, due to
their  anti-dualistic  monism  (Horstmann  2004:  25f.),  seem  more  advanced  and  more
contemporary than ever.
8 Dewey’s  way  to  face  the  danger  of  excessive  rationalism  is  to  put  the  notion  of
‘experience’ at the heart of his understanding of rationality. Yet that move alone does not
constitute  a  depart  from  idealism.  Dewey  joins  the  idealist  tradition  in  criticizing
empiricism for what we call nowadays the ‘myth of the given.’ Thus, Dewey shares the
idealist  understanding  that  experience  is  inherently  rational  and  hence  intimately
connected with human understanding. Experience is not something brutely given; values,
meanings and purposes are to be defended as a rational part of the world, not as mere
projections upon it. Along with the classical idealists, Dewey believes in the constructive
and  even  constitutive  role  of  reason  in  the  formation  of  knowledge  by  experience.
Dewey’s main problem with idealism, however, is that it does not put enough trust into
experience, hedging it within the confines of ‘Reason’ with a capital ‘R.’
9 Idealism, Dewey objects, explains the permeating rationality of experience at the expense
of  any  actual  experience  and  its  unruly  possibility  to  irritate  thinking.  A  common
expression of  Dewey’s final  judgment on idealism is his  statement that it  exclusively
identifies “the object of knowledge with reality, equating truth and Being” (LW 1: 126).
Here Dewey sees  idealism under  the influence of  a  deeply problematic philosophical
tradition which identifies the knowledge of reality with philosophical knowledge, and thus
treats reality solely as an object of thought. This understanding of philosophy is a part of
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‘intellectualism’ in the sense mentioned above: It gives undue priority to knowledge when
it comes to articulating our relation to the world, and moreover, it institutes philosophy
as the final arbiter of any claim to reality.
10 Dewey’s systematic point, as I understand it, is that there is no need for philosophy to
define in final terms what ‘rationality’ is or what it amounts to. If there is a need, it is
common to all kinds of human self-reflection and not specific to philosophy. Rationality
is something natural; it is embedded in organic life; and it is only one part of what makes
human life  special  (the other parts  being communication and linguistically  mediated
sociality  in  particular).  Dewey’s  position is  comparable  to  Wittgenstein’s  criticism of
philosophy, that it is not satisfied until it has proven that language works, ignoring in the
meantime that language has in fact long being doing the very kinds of work required to
reach that conclusion at all. Likewise, the idealist is not satisfied until he has proven the
ultimate importance and the final form of rationality on some metaphysical level. Dewey,
on the other hand, offers a defense of what one might call the ‘ordinariness’ of reason. To
use one of Dewey’s favorite methodological terms: he wants to reconstruct rationality,
rather than to explain its particular power.
11 Thus, along with the idealists, Dewey accepts the idea of rationality as a driving force in
the organization of life. Thinking opens up new possibilities of control and mastery, it is
indeed  ‘autonomous,’  as  idealism  claims  –  but  only  if  we  understand  autonomy  as
constitutively bound to ‘heteronomous’ factors. Thinking, as Dewey understands it, only
works by cooperating with non-thinking aspects of the world, such as tools, signs, bodies;
or generally, by making use of circumstances and forces ‘external’ to thinking as such.
Contra idealism, what makes thinking rational, then, is that it is exposed to an uncertain
future, and that it is determined by habits which are never completely under its control.
But  showing  that  the  very  operation  of  reason  depends  upon  time  and  upon  the
contingencies of the situation is no surrender of its critical autonomy.2 The idea is rather
that reason can only solve its problems by linking its own fate with such ‘this-worldly’
factors.  We  are  “dependent  rational  animals,”  to  pick  up  a  phrase  from  Alasdair
MacIntyre  (2002).  This  statement  is  no  contradiction,  as  if  rationality  required
independence. We are rational precisely because we are dependent. 
12 In what follows, I will develop this argument in three steps. The first, covered in sections
2 and 3, will reconstruct Dewey’s estimation of the philosophical tradition as a response
to the ineliminable practical  risks  of  living.  ‘Thought’  seems to be such a  promising
candidate for philosophical reflection since it promises order in a life full of uncertainty.
Idealism, as I will show in section 4, adds a specific flavor to that traditional high esteem.
It  argues  for  what  we  can  call  the  ‘thesis  of  the  irreducible  human  contribution.’
According  to  this  thesis,  all  knowledge  and  experience  is  irreducibly  bound  to  the
structure of the thinking (human) mind, and thus also dependent on it. In consequence,
every reflection on how we relate to the world also has to take into consideration how we
relate to ourselves. But idealism, Dewey claims, misconceives this idea by articulating it
in purely intellectual terms – this is the ‘intellectualism’ I have been introducing above.
Dewey’s  own  positive  conception,  to  which  I  turn  in  the  last  section,  accordingly
highlights that the effectivity of thought can only be explained by reference to that what
is not thought – a constitutive difference which the idealist tradition mistakenly tries to
close off. 
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2. The Promise of Thought
13 Idealism  misunderstands rational  thinking  –  this  is  one  way  to  articulate  Dewey’s
opposition to that tradition. Such a claim from Dewey’s side requires a preconception of
what ‘thinking’ is, empirically, prior to any philosophical rationalization. The building
blocks  for  such an account  can be  found in  his  pedagogical  writings  (How we  Think, 
Democracy and Education) and are developed at some length in Reconstruction in Philosophy,
in  The  Quest  for  Certainty and  Experience  and  Nature.  Dewey’s  approach  is  historical.
Thinking is not anthropologically or transcendentally given; rather, it has been culturally
discovered and cultivated. We have to look at this history in order to understand what is
at issue with this concept (cf. LW 1: 126).
14 Such a look at history cannot claim to discover thinking as it is ‘in itself.’ Even though
Dewey sometimes sounds like he is describing the real (‘empirical’) nature of thinking, it
is an essentially open term. History provides material,  but no final judgments on the
matter. What thinking ‘really’ is, has to be determined again and again through thinking
itself: “We do not know what meaning is to be assigned to ‘reflective thought’ except in
terms of what is discovered by inquiry into inquiry” (LW 12: 29). So Dewey’s historical
observations should not be taken as disclosing some hidden origin of thought. Rather,
they provide conceptual landmarks for his own ‘inquiry into inquiry.’
15 Philosophical interest in thought and thinking, according to this historical approach, is
continuous with the ordinary,  everyday interest in thought and thinking.  It  picks up
cultural  preconceptions and articulates them. Philosophical  theories might eventually
break  radically  with  ordinary  life,  but  they  begin  by  responding  to  a  commonly
experienced practical feature of thought. By thinking, the human being seems to be able
to introduce order  into a  world full  of  contingency and disruption.  Thus,  there  is  a
practical  ground which  justifies  Western  philosophy’s  traditional  preoccupation with
knowledge, reason and rationality (LW 4: 234). In Dewey’s words: 
The striving to make stability of meaning prevail over the instability of events is
the main task of intelligent human effort. (LW 1: 49) 
16 Rationality, according to this understanding, is a means to generate stable meanings over
and against an inherently unstable world. Note that Dewey’s description implies a gap
between  thinking  (what  he  calls  “intelligent  human  effort”)  and  the  “instability  of
events.” Firstly, thinking is concerned with the “stability of meaning,” as opposed to the
stability of  events.  Therefore,  its  foremost  task is  to understand and to describe the
change  of  events,  not  to  stabilize  them in  the  sense  of  ‘fixing’  them.3 Furthermore,
thinking is only described as ‘striving’ to fulfil this task, implying that even this more
modest goal will often be frustrated. This reservation is well expressed in the classical
understanding of philosophy as the love of wisdom, and not wisdom itself, which Dewey
embraces (cf. MW 11: 43).
17 Dewey’s rather wide and historic conception of thought distances itself from the modern
identification of thinking with scientific rationality. In Dewey’s perspective, by contrast,
the scientific treatment of problems is only one way of thinking among many possible
others. Its value stems from the particular role scientifically warranted knowledge can
play in experience, rather than from the rigorous systematic or logical form this kind of
inquiry assumes.  Yet Dewey is not (pace Rorty 1979) simply renouncing the need for
epistemology  and  epistemological  justification.  Rather,  he  conceives  epistemological
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thinking as one region within the wider area of thinking in general. Knowledge is special
insofar it has to be true to the events; but there are many more ways to investigate the
meaning of events than just scientific knowing. As Dewey puts it: “Beyond this island of
meaning which in their own nature are true or false lies the ocean of meanings to which
truth and falsity are irrelevant” (LW 3: 4). The overarching goal of thinking, according to
this understanding, is to give significance to the course of events, not to control or to
predict it.
18 Keeping in mind the distance between thought and its possible real effects helps to avoid
a reading of Dewey’s remarks that is too heavily pragmatist. Dewey consciously avoids the
rather short-sighted position that thinking is valuable only because of its efficacy. On the
philosophical  battleground, such an argumentation would indeed amount to a simple
petitio. Dewey would thus project a pragmatist criterion of efficacy onto the history of
thought, but only to use it as purported ‘evidence’ for the defense of his own, pragmatist-
leaning, understanding. Such an approach would imply that utility is the only criterion of
all thought, and thus define thinking, instead of registering its different forms, as Dewey
wished. 
19 The deeper systematic issue, however, is that such a purported pragmatist preconception
of thought would cut through the recursive definition quoted above. Thinking is what
thinking determines itself to be, according to the objective needs of the situation. This
self-referential  definition  is  not  an  evasion  of  philosophical  responsibility,  but  an
expression  of  the  necessity  to  keep  the  means  of  reflection  responsive  to  varying
historical and cultural demands. According to Dewey, any form of reflection is a possible
response to some experienced rupture in thought  or  action,  that  is,  to  the thought-
provoking experience that a situation has become “indeterminate” (LW 12:  109).  The
adequate determination of the individual problem at hand, whatever that may be, might
call for new methods and concepts. Thus, thinking has to remain sensitive to the need for
change and amendment,  as required by the subject-matter at hand: “All  materials of
experience are equal […] each has a right to be dealt with in terms of its own especial
characteristics and its own problems” (LW 4:  172).  In order to do justice to the wide
variety of problems experienced, a wide variety of thought is required. 
20 Thought,  according  to  Dewey,  is  therefore  discussed  better  in  terms  of  its  potential.
Accordingly, Dewey’s history of thought is a history of the discovery of new promising
potentials of thought and the subsequent historical work of determination of these ideas.
The experimental empirical method of the natural sciences, for example, had to be formed
; it was neither simply given, nor created at a single stroke (LW 4: 77). Yet Dewey insists
on a common thread running through all the forms of thinking which might possibly
emerge – they have the power to find order in chaos: “When thinking is successful, its
career closes in transforming the disordered into the orderly” (LW 1: 60).
21 Here we come to the core of Dewey’s empirical description of thought. In thinking, we are
able to reach necessary or determinate conclusions which can orient our actions. This
work is done by integrating an uncertain phenomenon within a wider context. One of
Dewey’s (characteristically medical) examples is the knowledge of typhoid fever: Issuing
such a diagnosis means being able to do something about it, instead of succumbing to the
mere ‘what-ness’ of the symptoms manifested. More precisely, through the diagnosis, the
phenomenon becomes a symptom, from which an indication of possible ways of treating
the illness follows (LW 4: 234). This example focuses on epistemology and its potential to
guide human actions; but it can be generalized to all cases of successful thinking which
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enable us to relate to an initially problematic phenomenon, be it an illness, a puzzling
smile  or  the  unsettling  experience  of  a  modern  artwork.4 Thinking  transforms  “the
unclear and ambiguous into the defined and unequivocal,” it changes the “disconnected
into the systematized” (LW 1: 60). Note that the ‘unity’ implied here is not to be confused
with ‘harmony’; it denotes a merely formal integration of the event into a network of
meaning which itself is full of tension and contradiction.
22 The necessity discovered by thinking is  valuable because of  its  stark contrast  to the
precarious and contingent nature of action. Living is a practical activity; there are always
things which need to be done. But Dewey never tires of reminding us that no practical
activity is ever secure: “Doing is always subject to peril, to the danger of frustration” (LW
4: 27). This statement, and the many others like it found in Dewey’s work (cf. LW 4: Ch. 1,
or LW 1: Ch. 2), are not empirical observations. They point rather to the fundamentally
contingent nature of action. Since every action is temporal, it requires the agent to act in
what might be described as a ‘subjunctive mood’: We act as if we know where our actions
will lead to, but the result of any action, even that taken from within the most controlled
settings, can always fail to meet our expectations. 
23 In action, therefore, we are by necessity focused on something which has yet to turn out
to be what we expect from it, and we are ourselves in turn dependent on this course of
events. This unavoidable transitory structure of action (and of organic life in general)
makes thinking stand out. It promises to disclose necessary structures which prevail even
when the events themselves disappoint. Thus, Dewey’s systematic argument is to point to
a normative gap between our understanding of a situation and its resistant reality. The
quest for certainty is not simply the quest to get hold of what is valuable, in terms of
possession or ownership. It is the quest, rather, to know what one is about. The certainty
it seeks is a formal feature of any successful normative relation which enables us, say, to
identify an object, or to recognize a valuable action, or to know how to judge someone’s
behavior. Thinking is primarily concerned with those normative relations, and only in a
secondary sense with tangible results. 
24 Again,  thinking is  kept  at  a  distance from reality:  it  works with relations which are
certain precisely because they are normative, and at a remove from the actual course of
events.  In  this  way,  thinking  can  provide  stable  terms  of  judgment,  standards  of
correctness, and justifications of goals, desires and values. Its primary goal is to ensure
“the validity of intellectual beliefs” (LW 4: 32; my emphasis), as Dewey points out. The fact
that these beliefs can, and most often will, stand out in stark contrast to the real course of
life,  actually  enforces  the  importance  of  thought.  The  intellectual  problem  always
remains the same: to know whether the situation is at least rightly understood. Such an
understanding  might  be  given  in  terms  of  a  scientific  explanation  or  in  terms  of  a
meaningful narrative of another sort; it might involve religious beliefs or restrict itself to
a strictly secular standpoint; but it is still thinking – a means to relate to the world in a
more meaningful way. According to this conception, then, philosophy’s task, to which we
turn now, is to explain that particular power of thinking.
 
3. Explaining the Power of Thought 
25 The previous section outlined Dewey’s understanding of thinking as a natural, everyday
process,  and thus,  like all  other natural processes,  as an historically unfolding event.
Intelligent reflection is a means to secure, establish and re-establish normative relations
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(‘meanings’) which promise to make sense of what is happening. This conception is not
particularly  pragmatist.  What  is  pragmatist,  though,  is  Dewey’s  additional  claim that
thinking should eventually expose itself to the consequences of real events, because that
is where, for Dewey, its genuine authority arises (LW 4: 110). For it is such attention to
consequences that separates responsible inquiry from mere wishful thinking. 
26 It  is  important  to  keep  in  mind,  however,  that  Dewey  is  not  claiming  that  other
philosophical conceptions of rationality are simply wrong, nor is he claiming that they
are  irrational.  Quite  to  the  contrary:  given the  recurrent  gap  between thinking  and
reality, nothing is more natural and self-evident than to explain the integrative power of
thinking by reference to some ultimate, transcendent order to which thought maintains a
privileged access.  After all,  philosophy participates in the general  human concern to
reach the “greatest attainable security of values” (LW 4: 28).
27 In consequence, the historical dominance of the “spectator theory of knowledge” (LW 4:
14) within philosophy is no accident. Far away from being a simple mistake, it constitutes
itself  a  rational  way of  explaining thought.  Separating the “realms of  knowledge and
action” (LW 4: 14) allows to make sense of that impressive stability pertaining to the
products  of  thought.  Compared  to  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  life,  the  products  of
thinking seem to be so superior that they must spring from some other source. Since
temporal, practical activity is by definition exposed to the danger of failure and the risk
of misunderstanding, thinking seems to be an activity of a completely different order.
The normative power of thinking, along with its demonstrable (albeit limited) capacity to
find and establish necessary relations, is attributed to a stable and stabilizing realm on its
own.
28 Accordingly,  ‘reality,’  in  the  philosophical  sense,  is  identified with that  stability  and
located in the stable order of thought, as opposed to the ordinary world of changing
phenomena and shifting appearances. In this traditional view, the power to make sense of
the world is due to cognitive apparatuses participating in this other-worldly sphere.5
Idealism, in Dewey’s eyes, shares this traditional approach to some degree, as we will see
in the next section.
 
4. The Human Contribution
29 The observation of the previous sections sheds some light on Dewey’s complex relation to
idealism, the central topic of this article. We have seen that for Dewey, the power of
thought is empirically given; but what remains contentious is how to explain, and to
further determine, that power. Dewey’s criticism of idealism, then, focuses on this second
step. According to Dewey, idealism rightly claimed that knowledge, value and meaning
can be both objective and a human product; this view vindicates the power of thought. In
doing so, idealism acknowledges the rise of modern science and its impressive power to
understand, and to change, the world in unprecedented ways (LW 1: 125f.). But it wrongly
construed this relation in purely intellectual terms, Dewey claims. 
30 In  terms  of  the  historical  narrative  just  presented,  idealism  accepted  that  rational
thought does indeed have a power that makes a difference.  In order to explain that
difference, idealism points to experience. Human experience is not completely ‘alien’ to
the thinking human mind; it is dependent on the categories, the norms, the concepts and
the  beliefs  the  mind  entertains.  Furthermore,  this  infusion  of  the  human  mind  to
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experience  does  not  devalue  the  power  of  thought.  Quite  to  the  contrary:  thought,
idealism claims, has the power to disclose objective features of reality only because of that
junction of mind and experience. In this way, idealism comes to acknowledge what I call
the ‘human contribution’ to all experience (cf. for Dewey’s analogous use of that term, LW
10: 250-75). For Dewey, recognizing the human contribution to all knowledge is essential
to modern philosophy and cannot be taken back. But idealism went astray, Dewey claims,
in conceiving this empowering link between thought and world only intellectually, that
is, mainly in terms of thinking and knowing.
31 One problem with Dewey’s criticism, however, is that it addresses ‘idealism’ in a very
general and abstract way. It can be profitably compared with references to ‘the skeptic’ in
some contemporary discussions: they point to a general attitude within philosophy, not
to some specific author.6 That might have been an important strategic move in Dewey’s
times,  when  idealism was  a  well  received  (though  already  stumbling)  contemporary
option. Yet historically, ‘idealism’ covers many different positions, beginning with Fichte,
Schelling and Hegel  –  the classical  German idealists  –  up to  British idealism and its
American reception (Green, Bradley, Royce). In particular, there are many different ways
to address the ‘thinking mind’ in idealism, ranging from Fichte’s I to Hegel’s Geist up to its
various  later  interpretations.  All  of  these  varieties  imply  different  concepts  of  what
reason, rationality and thinking are like – take, for example, Hegel’s distinction between
the Objective Spirit and the Subjective Spirit, which are both rational and yet can hardly
be said to ‘think’ in the same way. Dewey’s diagnosis lacks the depth and the cogency of a
detailed study. His remarks about idealism, if not simply directed at ‘idealism’ in general,
often refer rather vaguely to philosophers he considers to be idealists, without a detailed
discussion of the authors or the concepts in question.7 
32 Instead of discussing Dewey’s position towards a specific idealist author, then, it seems
more productive to follow Dewey’s own understanding and to use ‘idealism’ as denoting
one fundamental option within classical modern epistemology. This option is based on
the Kantian claim that the object of knowledge is determined by thought.8 In Dewey’s
view, that claim is more than just a piece of epistemology. It further implies that all
knowledge and experience is only to be had with that irreducible human contribution to it.
According to that claim, knowledge is never simply forced on us. Rather, knowledge is an
expression of an active relation to the world, on the part of the ‘self,’ the ‘subject’ or the
‘mind.’ There’s no knowledge, no value, no meaning, not even a habitable world, without
this specific human contribution. In consequence, the power of thought becomes itself a
specific human power, and cannot be taken anymore to be aiming at a pre-existing non-
human truth.
33 According to Dewey, then, we have to see idealism primarily as defending the central
modern  idea  of  rational  self-determination.  This  idea,  embodied  in  the  Kantian
‘Copernican  Revolution,’  allows idealism  to  defend  modern  human  freedom  as  an
emancipation from theology and rationalist metaphysics, Dewey claims (LW 4: 229-30). It
identifies rationality with criticism and grants it the power to conform only to those
standards and measures it can rationally approve of. It points to the possibility of living a
self-determined life in a world that is not alien to us.9 
34 Such a view on idealism is still widely held today.10 We can trace it back to Kant’s claim
that the categories of experience are the work of the faculty of the understanding, which
in turn is considered as belonging to the transcendental rational nature of the human
being. Of course, Kant’s original claim raises well-known problems and paradoxes, such as
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epistemological  skepticism,  an  all-too  mechanistic  understanding  of  nature,  or  the
problem of the justification of the allegedly ‘transcendentally given’ categories of the
mind (cf. Horstmann 2004: 25-69). However, the idealist critics of Kant – Fichte, Schelling
and Hegel – were not trying to question the main idea of rational self-determination.
Rather, they sought to defend this claim by setting it up on more intellectually solid
ground. What is common to them all is the conviction that our experience of the world, in
one way or the other,  is  the product of  the activity of  the mind.  That human factor,
idealism claims, is an indispensable ingredient of all knowledge, without which any given
experience would be normatively inert and thus without meaning.11
35 Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy thus dramatically extend the classical philosophical
search for self-knowledge. As a consequence, the ancient call to ‘know oneself’ cannot be
limited anymore to practical matters only. If reality, or at least our knowledge thereof,
depends on the specific ways our mind is constituted, that very constitution moves to
center stage of philosophical reflection. There simply is no way to find out what reality
‘really’ is, or what it can possibly become, without figuring out what concepts, categories
and  norms  we  do  contribute  to  it.  Thus,  all  philosophical  subject-matters  turn  into
questions  concerning our  relation to  the  matter  discussed.  Furthermore,  this  relation
cannot  be reduced to  the contact  between ‘subject’  and ‘object,’  as  the post-Kantian
debate in idealism has shown. Hegel, for example, extends the constitutive dimension of
the mind, upon which philosophy has to reflect, to the dynamic development of nature,
history and society on a grand scale. Idealism, thus conceived, adds reflexivity to the quest
for certainty to a degree hitherto unknown. 
36 Importantly,  the  acknowledgment  of  an  irreducible  human  contribution  further
introduces  a  new  dimension  of  philosophical  responsibility.  Kant’s  famous  opening
sentence of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason illustrates that point: 
Human  reason  has  this  peculiar  fate  that  in  one  species  of  its  knowledge  it  is
burdened by questions which […] it is not able to ignore, but […] it is also not able to
answer.12 
37 Reason, Kant claims, plagues itself  with questions which cannot be answered because
they are wrongly put. For that reason, Kant’s critical philosophy wants to dissolve these
questions. They rest on a self-understanding that is wrong, because it is uncritical, Kant
claims. Here, the quest for certain knowledge is turned against the inquirer itself. Thus,
the  Kantian  way  of  questioning  rationality,  as  Conant  (2012)  shows,  actually  adds  a
further reflective turn to classical Cartesian skepticism. While Cartesian doubts only bear
on the possible contents of thought, Kantian-inspired skepticism expands them to the very
forms of reasoning itself, the way reason is structured. Philosophical reflection, thus, is
not exempted from doubt. In consequence, any non-dogmatic judgment about the world
also has to consider our very understanding of such a judgment, that is,  our critically
reflected understanding of ourselves. 
38 Dewey’s mature criticism of idealism has to be seen against this heightened sense of
reflective  responsibility  introduced  by  that  philosophy.  In  Dewey’s  eyes,  idealism’s
acknowledgment of the human contribution remains half-hearted. The idealist authors
rightly  point  out  that  in  answer  to  Kant’s  question  ‘How  is  knowledge  possible?’  a
reference to the forming and intervening activity of the human mind is unavoidable. Yet
they conceive this activity from a traditional perspective, Dewey claims. According to
idealism,  as  Dewey  understands  it,  knowledge  is  made  possible  by  belonging  to  an
encompassing structure of the I, the mind or the spirit; that is, the activity in question is
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delegated to the internal working of this structure. Idealism, Dewey thus claims, again
locates “the ideal authority of truth, goodness and beauty” in an ultimate structure of
being (LW 1: 52). It “fails to note the empirical concrete nature” of inquiry (LW 1: 61); it is
“guilty of neglect that thought and knowledge are histories” (LW 1: 126). 
39 It is easy to misunderstand these criticisms, in particular with respect to Hegel. Dewey
seems to overlook the eminently practical character of Hegel’s philosophy, his criticism
of  abstract  thinking and overly  unrealistic  ideals;  and Dewey seems to  be  particular
ignorant of Hegel’s dialectical insistence that all concepts have to realize themselves by
way of confrontation with that which is not conceptualized yet. But Dewey’s real target is
the  overall  philosophical  attitude.  He  actually  speaks  in  high  terms  of  Hegel’s
“glorification of the here and now” (LW 4: 51), but he mistrusts the “schematism” (LW 5:
154) of Hegel’s general philosophical approach.
40 As  a  consequence of  that  approach,  the  initial  responsible  insight  into  the human
contribution is again cast into a grand metaphysical scheme or logic. For idealism, the
concrete singular  experience is  of  cognitive and moral  value only insofar  it  remains
“prophetic of some final, all-comprehensive, or absolute experience, which in truth is one
with  reality”  (MW  3:  128).  In  doing  so,  the  effectiveness  of  thought,  the  power  of
understanding, is attributed to an overarching structure – at the expense of the specific
individual actions and the present aspirations. 
41 Traditional  intellectualist  philosophy,  thus,  drives  a  wedge  between  idealism’s  own
acknowledgment of the human contribution and its articulation of that idea. Post-Kantian
idealism, Dewey claims, is forced to oscillate between two poles which it cannot really
unite. It insists on thought as “operative and constructive” (MW 3: 133), that is, it insists
on the importance of thought as a regulating agency, as an intervening force that makes a
difference.  But  idealism also  feels  obliged to  rationalize  being itself,  and thus  treats
thought as a part of the ontological layout of reality (cf. also LW 1: 60). Thought, then,
becomes itself a given (that’s the Kantian variant) or is declared to be becoming itself
(most prominently in Hegel).
42 The point now is that this second, ontological strategy undermines the original insistence
on thought’s regulative power. It makes it hard to explain that there is something to be
gained by further reflecting on thought in its regulative function. That way, the newly
gained responsibility for thought is evaded again. All changes in the structure of thought
have to be either denied, or they have to be attributed to the ontological process itself,
thereby bypassing our current desires and struggles. In any case, ‘thinking’ is located on
such a remote, philosophical plane that it is far removed from actual experience and its
needs and pressures. 
43 Dewey’s  criticism,  thus,  aims  at  preserving  what  we could  call,  following  Haugeland
(1998), the existential dimension of rationality. Understanding ourselves is something that
matters,  and it matters precisely because we are, in reflecting, as idealism points out,
forced back upon ourselves again and again. But idealism is led astray by consistently
situating  that  rational  self-reference  within  a  structure  detached  from  the  current
situation, in the existential sense. 
44 The problem, then, is of a practical nature. Dewey wants reflective thought to remain a
vital  option.  Since  the  very  way  we  think  makes  a  difference,  the  ways  of  thinking
themselves must remain open to reflective change. They have to be responsive to the
given situation. Like a tool, thought is supposed to do its work; but it has to be open to
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modifications  as  well  as  to  alternatives.  Consequently,  any  conception  of  rationality
which is interested in preserving thought’s flexibility has to move beyond intellectualism.
It has to attribute a determining role to the non-thinking, embedding context of thought.
Due to its exclusive focus on knowledge and logic, intellectualism cannot cope with that
existential and experiential background of thought proper. 
45 Ultimately, the rejection of intellectualism amounts to the claim that thought is temporal
in its very nature, and not due to some secondary limitations of the finite human mind.
The very fact that thought matters to us is itself already not a purely intellectual fact,
that is, it is not something to ‘know’ or even to ‘prove’ by means of distanced logical
deduction. Thought matters insofar as there is something at issue, something that is as
yet indeterminate,  unknown, opaque; in pragmatist terms: thought is a response to a
problematic  situation.  Looking  at  that  problematic  situation  from  the  standpoint  of
knowledge and theoretical certainty, intellectualism reduces this problematic situation to
a mere intermediary step towards greater knowledge. As a consequence, it subordinates
the process of thought to its results. For Dewey, though, thought has to be fully accepted
precisely in this temporal dimension in order to even make sense of its results.
46 Maybe the best way to summarize Dewey’s criticism is to say that he does not only want
to  keep  thought  open  for  continual  revision,  as  most  modern  philosophers  do.
Additionally,  he  wants  to  defend  the  existential  relevance  of  this  openness  and
reflexivity. Not just thinking, but also the ways we think do matter for us, individually, in
the situations in which we happen to be. Idealism, one could say, evades this existential
dimension by arresting thought metaphysically. This evasion, though, is due to a deeper
underlying  issue,  that  runs  throughout  the  philosophical  tradition  as  a  whole:  the
attitude of ‘intellectualism.’ In line with this attitude, idealism equates knowledge with
reality in its fullest sense. It overlooks the fact that knowledge matters because it is part
of something that is not knowledge, or at least not reducible to it – what Dewey variously
refers to as ‘situation,’ ‘problem,’ or simply ‘experience.’ The next section will clarify a bit
further how that relation of thought to non-thought, which constitutes Dewey’s anti-
intellectualism, should be understood.
 
5. Decentering Thought 
47 We can now sum up the narrative of the preceding sections. Idealism, in Dewey’s eyes,
combines a correct insight with a problematically traditional attitude towards explaining
that  insight.  Idealism is  right  to  connect  the  power  of  thought  with the  specifically
human contribution to experience. This insight allows idealism to acknowledge that the
products  of  intelligence  are  not  simply  given,  but  made.  The  concepts  we  use,  the
categories through which we experience, the norms we are bound to – they all contribute
to  experience.  Thus,  our  understanding  of  the  world  and  of  ourselves  profits  from
reflecting upon that human contribution; we might think here about Kant’s dismissal of
certain question as simply wrongly put. Yet this reflexivity, Dewey argues, is essentially a
practical  problem,  which  cannot  be  explained  away  via  a  logical  or  conceptual
schematisation. Idealism remains ‘intellectualist’ insofar as it believes that this reflexivity
is something which itself needs to be established in terms of knowledge.
48 Granted, the terminology Dewey uses to tell that story can at times be a bit misleading. In
particular,  the  charge  of  ‘intellectualism’  evokes  an  opposition  to  the  classical
understanding of rationality, whereas Dewey is actually aiming at its defense. Dewey’s
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position should not be confused with the general vitalist distrust of concepts, such as that
which can be sometimes found in James.13 On the contrary, Dewey believes firmly in the
power of knowledge to guide actions and to secure valuable practices. Dewey’s point is
not to dismiss rationality, but rather to insist that rational thought is constitutively bound
to that which his not thought.
49 In this final section, I will add some clarifying remarks to that central idea, which will
complete  this  survey  of  Dewey’s  charge  against  idealism.  For  Dewey,  the  power  of
thought cannot be explained only by reference to the human contribution alone. Such an
explanation also has to focus on what we could call the ‘differential nature’ of thinking,
which denies that there are any stable and final identities both of thought and of human
nature.
50 We can introduce this idea by recalling that thinking is, for Dewey, always a response to
what  he  calls  a  ‘problematic  situation.’  The  term  ‘problematic’  has  an  irreducible
existential  aspect.  A  problematic  situation  is  not  just  something  puzzling,  but  an
experience of “tension,” of being full of “doubts” or of being unsure how to proceed (cf.
LW 12: 109). It is an experience of incompatible ways of continuing action (LW 4: 189).
Therefore,  the problematic  quality  of  a  ‘situation’  is  to  be understood temporally.  It
expresses that  there is  something at  stake insofar as  the further development of  the
situation is unsure and calls for a resolution. 
51 This problematic situation, now, is not just the negligible origin of thinking or its cause; it
also constitutes its “working context” (MW 6: 88) from which intellectualism abstracts.
Thinking,  for  Dewey,  does  its  work  by  introducing  directed changes  to  that  specific
individual situation. It is related to that situation in an essential way, in the same way the
organism is constitutively related to its environment. Organic interaction establishes a
pattern which “foreshadows” this operative scheme of rational thought, as Dewey claims
(LW 12: 40). 
52 But  while  changing  the  environment  is  something  every  organism  does,  thinking
constitutes a distinct way to interact with the situation.  First of  all,  it  is  an indirect
response, which first restrains from immediate and spontaneous action in favor of the
right solution (LW 4: 180). Secondly, as a response, it includes the responding subject
itself  as  a  contributing factor  to  the situation (LW 4:  185f.).  Both aspects  are  linked
together. What is inquired into is how our own possible contributions to the situation
might, in their consequences, change the situation.
53 As Godfrey-Smith (2016) points out, the change instituted by thought might be restricted
to a change in our mere understanding of some elements of the situation. It does not need
to be a physical external change. To use Godfrey-Smith’s own nicely suggestive example:
Once we understand how to crack a nutshell  open,  its  contents become immediately
accessible to us, even if we do not go any further and leave the nut itself untouched. What
matters is the new potential found by thinking. But note also that this description of
change still conforms to Dewey’s claim that his theory “introduces no elements save such
as are public, observable, and verifiable” (LW 4: 182). If we claim that we have understood
something, this claim has to manifest itself in our actions, i.e. in the way we treat nuts or
in the way we talk about them. In sum, thinking results in organizing experience in a
different way, which in turn manifests itself in ways of acting. New possibilities present
themselves, previous impasses fade away. 
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54 Thinking, then, is constitutively dependent on this ‘working context’ in which thinking is
called for. An important consequence of this claim is that we do not always think. We are
living an organic and habitual life, in which thought is an option, but not a permanent
reality.  However,  there is,  Dewey adds,  a  possibility to foster thinking by cultivating
doubt  and  creative  imagination:  “The  scientific  attitude  is  that  which  is  capable  of
enjoying the doubtful” (LW 4: 182). In any case, thoughtful inquiry is only one possible
response to a doubtful situation, other possibilities being, for example, direct emotional
or habitual responses (cf. LW 4: 180f.). Furthermore, since thinking is the most indirect and
most open type of response, it is not necessarily superior to other, more spontaneous
reactions. 
55 Yet there is a reason why thinking, for us, seems to be so ubiquitous and so pervasive. We
are accustomed to thinking as the preferred way to treat problems, since we live in a
world which is itself formed by thought. The ordinary world is replete with products of
thought; thought is embodied in tools, signs, language, institutions and practices. Yet
these products of thought, again, are not themselves forms of thought. They are used by
thought because of their consequences and their acquired logical form, for they have
proven to be useful in one way or the other. But the often quite seamless process of their
application,  its  ordinary effectiveness,  is  an experiential fact  and cannot  be taken for
granted. Every new instance of their application might prove that our conception of these
tools and concepts was wrong, or partial, or incomplete.
56 Thus,  the  relative  ease  and  prevalence  of  everyday  thinking  is  the  product  of  our
acculturation into a human environment which is formed by thought, but which is not
identical  with it.  The problematic  situations we commonly encounter,  as  well  as  the
available means of response, belong to an encompassing set of compatible intellectual
and  normative  relations  embodied  in  our  culture.  They  are  the  historical  result  of
continuous and related changes being made to the human environment. We do not begin
anew in each problematic situation; we define, tackle and change it with more or less
established concepts and instruments. Thinking is “re-organization” (LW 1: 61), as Dewey
aptly puts it, and not a magical intervention ex machina. 
57 Taken this way, another aspect of thought’s constitutive ties to that what is not thought
comes  to  the  fore.  The  very  process  of  thinking,  according  to  Dewey,  requires  the
introduction of factors ‘external’ to thought. This refers to habits, concepts, or material
tools which allow us to introduce concrete changes in experience. Dewey discusses these
factors in his Logic, under the heading of the “matrix of inquiry” (LW 12: 7-102). They
establish the wider context out of which inquiry grows, and, more importantly, on which
inquiry has to draw in order to do its continuous work. 
58 The functional necessity of such a ‘matrix of inquiry’ is particularly evident with respect
to  the  historically  accumulated  materials  just  referred  to.  In  order  to  effectively
transform the problematic situation, thinking has to intervene in the course of events by
introducing materials which are not yet part of the situation. The problem being exactly that
the given situation does not resolve itself on its own, any conscious attempt to make
sense of the situation has to introduce such ‘external’ material. This material connects
the problematic situations with reliable, already existent ways of interaction, thus re-
integrating the elements of the situation into a wider, historical context. In Dewey’s own
example, a certain “speck of light” in the telescope of the astronomer is identified as a
star, and thus receives a new intellectual treatment.14 Such an introduction of ‘external’
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conceptual  and  material  tools  allows  to  approach the  problematic situations  in  new
determinate ways. 
59 But the dependency of thought on ‘external’ tools, concepts and material, also applies the
other way around. For Dewey, the material used has no ultimately fixed meaning. Its use
is,  essentially,  experimental.  We  expect  it  to  do  some  work,  but  it  might  turn  out
otherwise. Thus, the repeated use of the material used does not leave them untouched as
a  means  of  reflection.  In  re-using  existing  concepts  or  instruments,  we  also  learn
something new about their individual power. We learn to differentiate their use or to
limit our understanding of their potential:  “use re-shapes the prior materials” (LW 1:
217). Therefore, thought’s differential relation to non-thought is not only a condition of
the possibility of the operation of thinking itself. It is also a condition of the possibility of
changing thought, by changing its instruments, habits and ways of acting.
 
6. Conclusion 
60 Our exposition of Dewey’s differentiated position towards idealism comes to a close. For
the  purposes  of  this  paper,  the  short  outline  of  Dewey’s  positive  understanding  of
‘thinking,’ as it has been just presented, will suffice to illustrate the main point. We have
seen how thought is constitutively bounded to that which is not thought. Thought, first of
all, is temporally bounded. It is a response to the situated experience that something is
wrong. Furthermore, the results of that process of thinking can be anticipated, but they
cannot be taken for granted; they have to be realized. Thought, secondly, is materially
bounded,  insofar as this  activity requires tools,  practices and habits  that are already
available. This ‘external’ material is necessary to introduce new possibilities for acting
and thinking in the specific situation. Both dimensions are joined in the historic process
of refinement, further articulation and the subsequent differentiation of thinking. Tool
‘use’ is always ‘re-use’; the used tools themselves are re-shaped by their subsequent use in
novel situations. Thought, to sum up, is experientially bounded, insofar as the problematic
situation creates the relevant frame of reference within which thought has to find an
answer.
61 All of these points support Dewey’s rejection of what he considers the ‘intellectualism’ at
the heart of the idealist tradition. His main point is that the intellectual relation to the
world, and ‘knowing’ in particular, constitute just one kind of interaction with the world
among others. Moreover, knowledge only has a specific value because of this difference.
Knowledge,  Dewey  explains,  is  a  “differential  term.”  Its  meaning  is  defined  by  the
contrast it has to that which is not knowledge – such as “ungrounded conviction,” “mere
guess-work” or “the [practical] inexpertness that accompanies lack of familiarity” (MW 6:
112). Likewise, thought only stands out in comparison to other ways of responding to a
problematic situation.
62 We are now in a position to finally formulate an answer to our initial question. How
‘idealistic’  is  Dewey’s  philosophy,  and  why  should  we  care?  Dewey’s  philosophy  is
‘idealistic,’  we can say, insofar as it acknowledges what I have been calling, following
Dewey, the ‘human contribution’ to all experience. There is no experience, no value, no
knowledge without a contribution from the human mind. At the same time, we can add,
Dewey departs from idealism by criticizing it  for treating that dependency in merely
intellectualist ways. 
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63 But  why  should  we  care  about  Dewey’s  distinctive  treatment  of  idealism,  and  of
intellectualism in general? In what sense is it important to discuss idealism’s ‘human
contribution’?  Because  it  is,  in  its  core,  a  discussion  of  freedom.  In  this  concluding
section, I am not able to expand that claim more thoroughly (see Volbers 2018 for a more
elaborated  defense).  But  I  hope  it  has  become  clear  that  Dewey’s  criticism  of
intellectualism is not just extending the list of factors which constitute human thought
and  experience.  It  further  expresses  the  claim  that  only such  an  anti-intellectualist
treatment of the relation of thought and experience is the right way to keep thinking
open  and  reflectively  sensitive  to  change.  Understanding  the  ‘human  contribution’
implies to understand that our specific contribution to experience, our culture, ideals and
cognition,  can never be spelled out in a final  manner.  There is  no ultimate,  culture-
transcending answer to the question what ‘we’ are and what ‘we’ can become, because the
meanings of our acts and practices continuously intertwine and shift in the course of
time. Thus, according to Dewey, the most rational way of self-understanding is to remain
open  for  change.  Not  only  scientific  norms  and  practices,  but  also  our  own  self-
understanding should be, in that sense, fallible.
64 Such  an  openness  to  change  now is,  for  Dewey,  a  necessary  condition  for  freedom.
Remember that ‘thinking,’ in Dewey’s use of the term, denotes more than just formal
deduction and epistemological  knowledge.  It  ranges from historical  inquiry to formal
logic, it includes works of art as well as ordinary attempts of conscious problem solving
and political action. A change in thinking, then, is in a fundamental way a change in who
and what we are. This is where, for Dewey, freedom resides: “We are not free because of
what we statically are, but inasfar as we are becoming different from what we have been”
(LW 3: 108). This understanding of freedom is also the basis of Dewey’s conception of
democracy as a way of  life.  According to Dewey,  democratic freedom is  a social  and
cultural constellation which leaves as much room as possible to the diverse forms and the
continuous  reworking  of  experience:  “Democracy  is  the  faith  that  the  process  of
experience is more important than any special result attained” (LW 14: 228).
65 Dewey’s claim about freedom, thus, can be seen as an expression of the wish to leave the
answer  to  the  question  ‘What  are  we?’  open  to  experience.  This  is  definitely  not  a
comforting wish.  But it  succeeds,  at  least  in my opinion,  in reclaiming the idea that
precisely because thinking is a difference that makes a difference, philosophical and non-
philosophical forms of thought do matter. These practices and their norms do contribute
to our possibilities of living, to the better and to the worse, and thus are rightly conceived
of as objects of further criticism and reflection. 
66 Ultimately,  the possibilities  of  changing our ways  of  thinking,  and the responsibility
resulting from such possibilities, should not be evaded. Neither by reducing thought to a
mere form without practical relevance or footing, nor by passing its development over to
speculative metaphysics on a grand scale. By decentering thought, Dewey is centering it
once again on its importance and relevance.
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NOTES
1. Following the convention, all quotes from Dewey are taken from the Collected Works, ed. by Jo
Ann Boyston, Carbondale.
2. For a much more detailed defense of this thesis, see Volbers 2018.
3. Cf.  Dewey’s  description  of  the  organism  as  a  means  to  establish  constant meaning  in  a
constantly changing environment (LW 12: 37). 
4. Dewey’s example is fire (cf. LW 1: 181f.). Already treating it as an object of worship is a form of
thinking, limited as it is. 
5. For a good description of classical realism, though with respect to Wittgenstein, see Mounce
2005.
6. Cf. the figure of ‘the skeptic’ in Cavell’s Claim of Reason (1979). One telling example of Dewey’s
rather  generalizing  treatment  of  idealism  can  be  found  in  his  Brief  Studies  of  Realism.  After
claiming that idealism has made the “ubiquity of [the knowledge] relationship its axiom,” he
quotes  Bain  (!)  as  evidence.  Dewey  takes  this  single  quotation  to  be  fully  representative  of
idealism in general: “One sample is as good as a thousand” (MW 6: 112). Later discussions, such as
in Experience and Nature or Quest  for  Certainty,  are somewhat more detailed,  but serve only to
reinforce his previous judgment. 
7. The 1897 lectures (Shook & Good 2010) show that Dewey actually had good knowledge of
idealism and in particular of Hegel, and that it was quite modern and ‘non-metaphysical,’ as the
editors of that volume point out. 
8. For a detailed reconstruction of Dewey’s debate with contemporary idealists, which focuses on
that claim, see Hildebrand (2003: 30-87).
9. A contemporary version of this idealistic vision can be found in McDowell (1996: 118): “the
world is where the human being is, where she is at home.” A recurring problem is, of course, how
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much negativity is allowed, to make some room for internal disruption and development, but
without breaking that basic relation. Hegel’s speculative metaphysics can be seen as the attempt
to allow as much negativity as possible while still holding fast to the basic claim of an ‘identity’ in
all differences (cf. Stern 2007; Giladi 2017). 
10. Horstmann  reconstructs  the  history  of  idealism  on  this  premise;  he  calls  it  the
“Aufklärungsthese”  (Horstmann,  2004:  27)  –  the  thesis  of  enlightenment.  Pinkard’s  (2002)
reconstruction highlights the Kantian idea of unconditioned moral autonomy as a driving force
in the development of German idealism. 
11. Incidentally, this is also the power of language, as Wittgenstein (1967) argues. Philosophy of
language, thus, has always had a strong affinity to idealism (Williams 1973; Bloor 2017).
12. Quoted from Cavell  (2004:  128),  who sees that statement as expressing “[the] idea of the
human as a burden to itself.” 
13. Cf. MW 6: 86-91, where Dewey separates his avowed ‘anti-intellectualism’ from James’s, and
also LW 1: 49. 
14. Dewey uses this astronomical example in LW 8: 238; cf. also LW 1: 115.
ABSTRACTS
The article presents Dewey’s own understanding of rationality by reconstructing his criticism of
idealism. For Dewey, idealism is an important and valuable expression of the modern idea that
both knowledge and values are historical products of human self-determination. Thus, it rightly
defends the power of thought against the uncritical claims of mere religious and social authority.
Yet idealism, Dewey claims, still misconceives that human power by ultimately treating it as a
merely  intellectual  power,  thus  following  the  philosophical  tradition.  For  Dewey,  however,
human thought and reasoning have to be understood in a much broader way. Dewey decenters
thought by arguing that it is a natural, dependent and essentially temporal process, in which the
intellectual  elements only play a subordinate role.  Thought,  he claims,  does not only have a
history;  furthermore,  thinking only matters  to human beings precisely  because it  is  open to
reflective change. Dewey’s position, thus, can be seen as an attempt to preserve the existential
importance of philosophical self-reflection by binding thought to history and change in a radical
way.
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